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‘MODERNISATION OF OUR HOSPITAL SYSTEM’: THE NATIONAL 
HEALTH SERVICE, THE HOSPITAL PLAN, AND THE ‘HARNESS’ 
PROGRAMME, 1962-77 
 
ALISTAIR FAIR 
 
NB: this is the ‘Author Final Version’, as accepted for publication following 
peer review. The final published (and illustrated) version appears in the 
journal Twentieth Century British History and may include editorial 
changes and corrections.  
 
 
In January 1962, the Daily Mail reflected on British hospital architecture: 
The average large city hospital is a grim, grimy, forbidding relic of the 
Victorian age, out of date and out of place. At last it is to be replaced by 
something as modern as, say, the latest office block.1 
The cause of the Mail’s optimism was the publication that month of ‘A 
Hospital Plan for England and Wales’. Overseen by the Minister of Health, 
Enoch Powell, this document set out ‘a plan not merely for building, 
remodelling or improving large numbers of hospitals, but for modernising 
the whole pattern and content’ of the National Health Service (NHS).2 In 1948, 
the newly formed NHS had inherited a collection of often aging institutional 
buildings. In their place, the Hospital Plan promised a systematic and 
apparently progressive approach, with Lord Newton referring to the 
‘modernisation of our hospital system’.3 A new generation of ‘District General 
Hospitals’ (DGHs) would promote economies of scale and medical efficiency. 
                                                
1 ‘The Hospitals’, Daily Mail, 24 January 1962. 
2 ‘A Hospital Plan for England and Wales’, Cmnd. 1604 (London, 1962), iii. 
3 Hansard, HL Deb 14 February 1962, vol. 237 c 473. 
 2 
With 600-800 beds, the Observer reported that they would ‘place the most 
modern treatment at the service of patients.’4 In essence, British hospital 
provision and architecture would be re-thought, in a context in which 
institutional, infrastructural, and urban modernization was being given 
tangible form by contemporary architecture. Underpinning the DGH concept 
was an assumption that new approaches to hospital design and construction 
were desirable in order to speed the realization of the Plan without excessive 
expense. As a result, during the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s, 
the Ministry of Health (and its successor from 1968, the Department of Health 
and Social Security [DHSS]) devoted significant resources to the question of 
standardization in hospital architecture. Several proposals resulted, 
culminating in a form of standardized planning and construction known as 
‘Harness’. Prototypes followed, before the programme was abandoned in 
1975. 
 
From the late 1950s, a belief in planning as a tool to reshape the 
economy, society, and the built environment was shared by both Labour and 
the Conservatives. Harold Macmillan’s Conservative governments, having 
come to accept the fundamentals of the post-war welfare state, embraced 
planning at the end of the 1950s.5 Rodney Lowe has seen this move as an 
attempt to ‘adapt Conservatism to the reality of an affluent, technologically 
complex society’,6 but there were also pragmatic factors in its favour, 
including sterling crises in 1957 and 1961, while it was thought that entirely 
reversing post-war policy – i.e., nationalization and the Welfare State – would 
in any case be impossible. The Hospital Plan thus came into being amid a rash 
                                                
4 ‘The Powell Ten-Year Plan for Hospitals’, Observer, 28 January 1962. 
5 Glen O’Hara, From Dreams to Disillusionment: economic and social planning in 1960s Britain 
(Basingstoke, 2007), 9. 
6 Rodney Lowe, ‘The Replanning of the Welfare State’, in Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger-
Bargielowska (eds), The Conservatives and British Society, 1880-1990 (Cardiff, 1996), 255-73 (p. 
255). 
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of modernizing ‘plans’, including the Robbins Report on Higher Education 
(1963), the Buchanan Report on traffic planning (1963), and the Parker Morris 
report on the design of housing (1961). The Public Expenditure Survey 
Committee was created in 1961, while the National Economic Development 
Council followed in 1962.7 Within this context, the Hospital Plan is 
nonetheless notable. The report covering England and Wales was followed by 
separate documents with proposals for Scotland and Northern Ireland.8 While 
hospital planning was not unique in its national scope, it was distinctive in 
the extent to which it proposed a centralized approach to provision and 
design. By contrast, the design of schools, housing, and universities remained 
local matters, albeit ones shaped by central-government finance.9 And yet, the 
NHS had been conceived with an essentially devolved structure. Enacting the 
Plan would, therefore, require careful negotiation with the regional bodies 
which oversaw hospital provision, and whose proposals the Plan in fact 
contained.10   
 
The push to realize hospitals within a planned system survived the 
elections of 1964 and 1970, partly in recognition of the real need for new 
buildings but also because planning and infrastructural modernization 
remained priorities, especially during the Labour governments of 1964-70.11 
The return of the Conservatives in 1970 seemed to promise a more laissez-
                                                
7 Christopher Pollitt, ‘The Public Expenditure Survey 1961-72’, Public Administration 55/2 
(1977), 127-42; Tony Cutler, ‘Economic Liberal or Arch Planner? Enoch Powell and the 
Political Economy of the Hospital Plan’, Contemporary British History 25/4 (2011), 469-89 (p. 
472). 
8 E.g. Summary of the Hospital Building Programme of the Northern Ireland Hospitals Authority, 
March 1963 (London, 1963).  
9 E.g. William Whyte, Redbrick: a social and architectural history of Britain’s civic universities 
(Oxford, 2015).  
10 Richard Biddle, ‘From Optimism to Anger: Reading and the local consequences arising 
from the Hospital Plan for England and Wales, 1962’, Family and Community History 10/1 
(2007), 5-17. 
11 Andrew Blick, ‘Harold Wilson, Labour, and the machinery of government’, Contemporary 
British History 20/3 (2006), 343-62. 
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faire approach, but in the event, the new government’s policy demonstrated 
continuities with its predecessors. Edward Heath’s ‘corporatist’ strategy was 
predicated on the involvement of employers and the unions in industrial 
policy,12 but the state nonetheless continued to act to control wages, prices, 
and investment,13 while what Robert Taylor has seen as Heath’s ‘government-
led growth strategy’ placed ‘strong emphasis on public investment 
programmes, especially in infrastructure’.14 Furthermore, while Heath 
promoted institutional reform using the language of contemporary 
managerialism, the reorganization of central and local government (and the 
NHS) was essentially underpinned by the same search for efficiency which 
had prompted the Hospital Plan ten years before.15 Nonetheless, the 
architectural and physical planning context had changed by the early 1970s.16 
There were growing doubts about the wisdom of comprehensive 
redevelopment in Britain’s towns and cities, while the belief of some 
designers and manufacturers in the value of industrialization and 
standardization was challenged. The partial collapse of the system-built 
Ronan Point flats in an explosion in 1968 served to give the debate a 
particularly clear focus.  
 
This article examines politicians’ and architects’ ambitions for the 
hospital system between 1962 and 1977. Planning in this period has attracted 
                                                
12 Andrew Gamble, ‘The decline of corporatism’, in Derek Crabtree and A.P. Thirlwall (eds) 
Keynes and the role of the state (Basingstoke, 1993), 41-68 (p. 44). 
13 Lowe, ‘Welfare State’, 267. 
14 Robert Taylor, ‘‘The Heath government, industrial policy and the “new capitalism”’, in 
Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (eds), The Heath Government 1970-1974: a reappraisal (London, 
1996), 136-59 (p. 138). 
15 John Campbell, Edward Heath: a biography (London, 1993), 384-5. 
16 Elain Harwood and Alan Powers, ‘From Downtown to Diversity: revisiting the 1970s’, 
Twentieth Century Architecture 10 (2012), 9–36. 
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extensive scholarship, engaging with the plans themselves,17 the extent to 
which planning involved the re-imagining of the built environment,18 and the 
idea that planning could be directed towards the construction of new kinds of 
citizenship.19 Many accounts take a critical or at least pessimistic view.20 Glen 
O’Hara, for example, contrasts initial ‘dreams’ with subsequent 
‘disillusionment’,21 while Alistair Kefford argues that the spatial practices of 
1960s planning marginalized those whose attitudes and behaviours failed to 
fit the planners’ paradigm.22 As far as the Hospital Plan is concerned, O’Hara 
dubs it ‘the most ambitious project hitherto mounted by the National Health 
Service’ but also points to the way in which it was based on guesswork; he 
questions the assumption that standardized hospitals were the best way 
forward.23 The present article seeks to augment this literature. It relates the 
drive to ‘plan’ the hospital system to the specific architectural response 
devised by the Ministry of Health and the DHSS. In so doing, it reveals the 
challenges of putting centralized planning into practice. By looking at the 
changing terms in which the re-planning of Britain’s hospitals was discussed, 
the competing groups that were involved, and changes in government policy, 
it is argued that the abandonment of the programme was as much the 
product of internal tensions inherent in the structure of the NHS as it was the 
result of financial pressures or worries about system-built modern 
                                                
17 E.g. Simon Gunn, ‘The Buchanan Report, Environment, and the Problem of Traffic in 1960s 
Britain’, Twentieth Century British History 22/4 (2011), 521-42. 
18 E.g. Otto Saumarez Smith, ‘Central Government and Town-Centre Redevelopment in 
Britain, 1959-1966’, Historical Journal 58/1 (2015), 217-44. 
19 E.g. Alistair Kefford, ‘Housing the Citizen-Consumer in Post-war Britain: the Parker Morris 
Report, affluence, and the even briefer life of social democracy’, Twentieth Century British 
History 2017 [online publication]. 
20 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have 
failed (New Haven, 1998). 
21 O’Hara, Dreams. 
22 Alistair Kefford, ‘Constructing the Affluent Citizen: state, space, and the individual in post-
war Britain 1945-79’, Ph.D. diss., Manchester, 2015. 
23 O’Hara, Dreams, 167, 188. 
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architecture. After 1975, a revised approach was developed which, by taking 
into account these internal tensions, was to enjoy significant success. 
 
THE HOSPITAL PLAN AND THE IDEA OF STANDARDIZATION 
The ‘Hospital Plan for England and Wales’ promised to rationalize the 
patchwork of hospitals which the National Health Service had taken over 
from previous charitable, voluntary, and municipal bodies in 1948. Many 
hospital buildings had seemed obsolete even in the 1940s in the face of 
advances in treatments, changes in population location, and, by the end of the 
decade, a growing population.24 In 1948, some 45% of British hospital 
buildings pre-dated 1891; 21% pre-dated 1861.25 The image of their Victorian 
architecture was also at odds with the values of the new Welfare State, which 
co-opted the forms and materials of modern architecture to provide new 
housing, schools, and, increasingly, universities. However, capital 
expenditure was restricted until 1955.26 The only major projects to be started 
were at Alexandria in central Scotland (Vale of Leven Hospital), and – in a 
different context of public health organization – Altnagelvin in Northern 
Ireland. However, the hiatus in major construction was nonetheless put to 
productive use. A multi-disciplinary research team was sponsored by the 
Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust to investigate hospital planning.27 Their 
report, published in 1955, reviewed the history of each part of the hospital 
before turning to present practice and future needs, showing how new 
models of care (such as ‘early ambulation’) required potentially new 
approaches to the arrangement of space within the hospital. Its findings 
                                                
24 ‘Hospital Plan’, 1. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Elain Harwood, Space, Hope and Brutalism: English architecture, 1945-1975 (New Haven and 
London, 2015), 284. 
27 [Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust], Studies in the Functions and Design of Hospitals 
(London, 1955). 
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informed some of the small number of projects which were begun in the 
second half of the 1950s, including a major hospital at Swindon.28 
 
In 1959, the Conservatives promised ‘a big programme of hospital 
building’.29 Driving this initiative was the Minister of Health, Enoch Powell, 
who believed that a planned network of efficient modern hospitals would 
allow greater control of on-going operational spending.30 He considered the 
NHS inferior to private medicine, but believed it could not be abolished and 
so needed ‘business-like improvement of its efficiency’.31 The cost of the NHS 
had long worried Conservatives.32 Well-planned new buildings, it was 
thought, would allow more efficient models of care to emerge, allowing 
scarce resources to be put to best use. Powell’s ultimate goal was a building 
which would be cheaper to run per bed or treatment than existing hospitals 
on account of its considered location, up-to-date planning, and inbuilt 
flexibility. (In practice, rising costs and increasing demand would ultimately 
challenge the idea that savings could be made.) The 1962 Plan therefore 
proposed that ninety ‘district general hospitals’ in England and Wales should 
be constructed by 1975, with 134 more being the subject of ‘substantial 
rebuilding’ at an estimated cost of £500 million. Expectations were high. The 
chairman of the Manchester Regional Hospital Board referred to the 
publication of the Plan as ‘the most momentous event in the history of the 
health service.’33  
 
                                                
28 Harwood, Space, Hope and Brutalism, 285. 
29 Conservative Party 1959 manifesto, ‘The Next Five Years’ (online at 
http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1959/1959-conservative-manifesto.shtml (accessed on 
11 February 2018)). 
30 Cutler, ‘Economic Liberal?’, 476-8. 
31 Lowe, ‘Welfare State’, 265. 
32 O’Hara, Dreams, 169. 
33 ‘Hospitals Building Programme’, Guardian, 24 January 1962, 10. 
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Progress, however, was slow. In 1965, the Labour Minister of Health, 
Kenneth Robinson, claimed that the Plan had been compiled in haste.34 
Research now suggested that ‘many of the schemes shown in the original Plan 
as expected to start by 1970/71 were inadequately defined and imprecisely 
costed’.35 Reappraisal was also suggested by continuing medical advances. 
Before the 1940s, much hospital care had essentially been convalescent. By the 
mid 1960s, however, hospitals were increasingly places of complex surgery 
and high-technology treatment. Furthermore, newly increased predictions of 
population growth also challenged the basis on which the 1962 Plan had been 
made, with the surge in the birth rate of the mid-1960s rivalling that of the 
mid-1940s: it was assumed that the British population would number 66.4 
million by 2001.36 In 1966, therefore, the Plan was revised. However, although 
the new document was presented as a ‘programme’ rather than a ‘plan’, the 
key assumption of 1962 – that new hospitals were needed – remained intact. 
Indeed, the Bonham-Carter report of 1969 on the functions of the DGH not 
only retained the concept but also increased its size. It was still believed by at 
least some civil servants that all pre-1939 hospital buildings would be 
replaced by 2001.37 The principle of major construction further survived the 
Conservatives’ 1970 general election victory. Sir Keith Joseph – now 
responsible for health – recorded in 1972 that the foundation of the system 
remained the planned DGH.38  
 
How would the Plan be delivered? The NHS was essentially 
decentralized as far as hospital management was concerned. For its first 
                                                
34 Hansard, HC Deb 22 Dec 1965 vol 722 c 2208. 
35 ‘The Hospital Building Programme: a revision of the Hospital Plan for England and Wales’, 
Cmnd. 3000 (London, 1966), 1. 
36 The National Archives: Public Record Office [hereafter ‘TNA: PRO’], Kew, MH166/486, 
Building Working Party Paper [hereafter ‘BWP’] 8, ‘Hospitals for the twentieth century’. 
37 Ibid. 
38 ‘The District General Hospital’, Hospital and Health Services Review, 68/3 (March 1972), 77. 
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twenty-six years, fourteen (later fifteen) large Regional Hospital Boards 
(RHBs) provided strategic oversight. Hospital Management Committees had 
important local roles, while teaching hospitals in England were run by 
separate Boards of Governors.39 (The revised system introduced in 1974 still 
left much power with the new Regional Health Authorities.) However, the 
Ministry increasingly sought to take an active role. In 1960, Raymond 
Gedling, its assistant secretary, reported that the Ministry wished to move 
away from the detailed interrogation of individual schemes to offer broader 
guidance.40 Echoing practice in the Ministry of Education, whose ‘Architects 
and Buildings Branch’ had been created in 1949 to investigate school design,41 
the Ministry of Health created its own Architect’s Department at the end of 
the 1950s, and soon employed more than 100 architects.42  
 
William Tatton-Brown was appointed chief architect in 1959. He had 
begun his career during the 1930s in Berthold Lubetkin’s progressive 
architectural practice, Tecton, before striking out on his own. Driven by a 
belief in the value of architecture as social service, in 1946 he moved into 
‘public’ practice, joining the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and 
then Hertfordshire County Council, where he was involved in the county’s 
programme of standardized steel-framed schools.43 At the Ministry of Health, 
Tatton-Brown inaugurated experimental projects including an innovative 
hospital at Greenwich, which was distinguished by its compact planning and 
                                                
39 Raymond Gedling, ‘The National Health Service’, RIBA Hospitals Course Handbook (London, 
1960), 8–11. 
40 Ibid. 10–11. 
41 Geraint Franklin, ‘“Built-in variety”: David and Mary Medd and the child-centred primary 
school, 1944–80’, Architectural History, 55 (2012), 321–67 (p. 328). 
42 Joe Kerr, ‘Obituary: William Tatton-Brown’, Independent, 10 February 1997 (online at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/obituary-william-tatton-brown-
1277973.html, accessed on 24 January 2017). 
43 Andrew Saint, Towards a Social Architecture: the Role of School-building in Post-war England 
(New Haven and London, 1987), 95–96. 
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air conditioning.44 The publication of ‘Building Bulletins’, which had begun in 
1957, was accelerated, and Tatton-Brown oversaw an accompanying series of 
‘Building Notes’, an idea borrowed from the Ministry of Education.45 These 
documents were cognisant of local practice but challenged the largely 
decentralized basis on which design had hitherto proceeded.  
 
Underpinning the 1962 Plan was a presumption in favour of design 
standardization. This idea was prominent in public architecture at the time, 
not least housing and schools.46 Hertfordshire’s well-received schools have 
been noted already: standardization and prefabrication allowed them to be 
rapidly and economically built. In the late 1950s, Nottinghamshire led the 
development of the ‘CLASP’ system. CLASP won a special prize at the 1960 
Milan Triennale, attracting international attention and seemingly confirming 
the value of this kind of approach.47 The use of standard components and 
‘industrialized techniques’ in design, procurement, and building was 
embraced by politicians across the political spectrum. For example, the 
Conservative manifesto in 1964 referred to the use of ‘up-to-date methods and 
techniques which save site labour and increase productivity’, with ‘voluntary 
consortia of local authorities and our National Building Agency’ (founded 
during Keith Joseph’s time as Minister of Housing) being intended to foster 
innovation.48 Labour, too, advocated the ‘more rapid use of industrialized 
                                                
44 ‘Greenwich District General Hospital’, Architects’ Journal, 139/23 (3 June 1964), 1263–68. 
45 [Ministry of Health], ‘Hospital Building Note 2: the cost of hospital buildings’ (London, 
1961), 4. 
46 Saint, Social Architecture; Miles Glendinning and Stefan Muthesius, Tower Block: Modern 
Public Housing in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (New Haven and London, 
1994); Christine Wall, An Architecture of Parts: Architects, Building Workers and Industrialisation 
in Britain (Abingdon, 2013). 
47 Saint, Social Architecture, 175-6. 
48 Conservative Party 1964 Manifesto, ‘Prosperity with a Purpose’ (online at 
http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1964/1964-conservative-manifesto.shtml (accessed on 
11 February 2018)). 
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building’.49 In a general sense, this agenda might be thought to reflect the 
interest of both parties in modernization. Certainly Powell in 1961 was critical 
of the frequent monumentality of the past: 
Hospital building is not like pyramid-building, the erection of 
memorials to endure to a remote posterity. We have to get the idea into 
our heads that a hospital is a shell, a framework, however complex, to 
contain certain processes, and when the processes change or are 
superseded, then the shell must most probably be scrapped and the 
framework dismantled.50  
This appeal to the ideas of obsolescence and change invoked themes which 
were often significant in modernist architectural discourse. Through the 
frequent use in modern architecture of steel and concrete structural frames 
rather than load-bearing walls, internal spaces could, in theory at least, be 
reconfigured in the light of changing needs, and some architects explicitly 
presented their work in terms of flexibility and indeterminacy.51  
 
It was also hoped that standardization and prefabrication would 
address issues in the building industry. In 1962, Baroness Summerskill linked 
the shortage of housing with a lack of skilled building labour.52 Standardized 
components, produced in factories, could often be assembled on building 
sites using semi-skilled workers. For this reason (among others), a modified 
version of the CLASP system was used at the new University of York, while 
after 1963 standardization and industrialization were encouraged in council 
                                                
49 Labour Party 1964 manifesto, ‘The New Britain’ (online at 
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab64.htm (accessed on 11 February 2018)). 
50 Enoch Powell, ‘Water Tower’ speech to the National Association for Mental Health, June 
1961 (online at http://studymore.org.uk/xpowell.htm (accessed on 6 February 2018)).   
51 E.g. Jonathan Hughes, ‘The indeterminate building’, in Jonathan Hughes and Simon Sadler 
(eds), Non-Plan: Essays on Freedom, Participation and Change in Modern Architecture and 
Urbanism (London, 2001), 90-103; Daniel Abramson, Obsolescence: an Architectural History 
(Chicago, 2016). 
52 Hansard, HL Deb 14 February 1962, vol 237 c 486. 
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housing in order to meet ambitious construction targets.53 Another strand to 
the parliamentary debate related to the cost of new hospitals. Lord Taylor 
referred to ‘the squandering of money’ and noted that the Ministry of Health 
had already begun to provide ‘model schemes […] as the Ministry of 
Education did for schools’, though more remained to be done.54 The matter, 
he concluded in a telling turn of phrase, ‘must be faced exactly like any other 
problem in industrial production.’55 In the Commons, William Hamilton 
similarly referred to the potential economies of standardization and 
industrialization, while Kenneth Robinson saw standardization as a way to 
reduce the protracted time taken to design and build new hospitals, asking 
‘must ten years always elapse?’56 Standardizing at least some of the ‘briefing’ 
and design work promised to reduce that time. 
 
The experience of other publicly-funded building types thus suggested 
that standardization might usefully help to deliver the Hospital Plan, whose 
proposed new buildings, it was hoped, would in turn generate Powell’s 
desired economies. In 1962, Lord Mills confirmed that the Ministry of Health 
was ‘paying great attention’ to the idea, though without wishing to impose ‘a 
uniform pattern’.57 Standardization was cited explicltly in the revised 
programme of 1966: ‘if more economical planning and design and more 
efficient building methods come to be adopted, some schemes may start, and 
finish, earlier than was originally anticipated.’58 By that date, the idea was 
being discussed by a Building Working Party, set up in 1965 under the 
chairmanship of Frank Mottershead, a senior civil servant. A close 
                                                
53 Harwood, Space, Hope and Brutalism, 259; John Boughton, Municipal Dreams: the rise and fall 
of council housing (London, 2018), 128. 
54 Hansard, HL Deb 14 February 1962, vol 237 c 563. 
55 Ibid., c 564. 
56 Hansard, HC Deb 4 June 1962, vol 661 cc 31-160. 
57 Hansard, HL Deb 14 February 1962, vol 237 c 573. 
58 ‘Hospital Building Programme’, 6. 
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examination of the Working Party’s papers does much to illustrate how the 
project unfolded, and the challenges of re-planning the NHS. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF HARNESS 
Mottershead’s Working Party began by asking whether the cost of hospital 
building could be halved.59 Two answers emerged. The first was the so-called 
‘Best Buy’ hospital, an attempt to build as cheaply as possible without 
compromising medical efficacy (fig. 1). ‘Best Buy’ combined a simplified 
version of the Greenwich design with greater reliance on community care in 
order to reduce the number of in-patient beds.60 The Working Party’s other 
focus was standardization.61 The Ministry inaugurated a ‘Standard 
Departments’ project in 1965, looking at the design of general and maternity 
wards.62 In parallel, the dimensions used in hospital building were 
rationalized and a range of standard components – including doors and 
signage – was developed in order to promote cost savings through long 
production runs.63  
  
Standardization in hospital design has attracted relatively little interest 
among architectural historians, who have preferred to focus on bespoke 
projects by well-known firms.64 However, it formed a significant strand in 
post-war British hospital architecture. The Oxford RHB, for example, 
                                                
59 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/486, Working Party (hereafter ‘WP’) minutes, 2 February 1966. 
60 W. Paul James and William Tatton-Brown, Hospitals: Design and Development (London, 
1986), 7. 
61 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/486, Note by Gedling, ‘Control of Building Schemes’, 29 October 
1965; WP minutes, 20 January 1966 and 16 February 1966. 
62 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/487, ‘Manpower for the new development programme’; 
MH166/662, Memo by K.G. Reeve, 29 August 1967. 
63 ‘Hospital Building Programme’, 9. 
64 See e.g. Elain Harwood, Space Hope and Brutalism: English Architecture 1945-1975 (New 
Haven and London, 2015), 277-95; Jonathan Hughes, ‘Hospital-city’, Architectural History 40 
(1997), 266-88. There is brief discussion of standardization in Jonathan Hughes, ‘The Brutal 
Hospital: efficiency, identity and form in the National Health Service’, PhD thesis, University 
of London, 1996, 224–35, but the account was written before Ministry papers were released. 
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developed a successful approach which coupled a steel-framed structure with 
prefabricated cladding. By the end of 1971, twenty-nine hospitals of this kind 
had been constructed.65 Meanwhile the well-publicized Vale of Leven 
Hospital (1955) corralled its departments into blocks of identical form (fig. 
2).66 Vale of Leven had been designed by Joseph Gleave, who at a 1961 
symposium advocated the use of a regular planning grid, as well as 
standardized components.67 Potentially significantly, Raymond Gedling – 
later to be a key member of the Mottershead Working Party – attended the 
symposium.68  
 
The Ministry’s standard general and maternity ward designs were in 
hand by summer 1967;69 they were planned as discrete H- and T-shaped 
blocks.70 In early 1968, however, the scale of ambition increased. A new 
project sought to develop ‘a family of individual hospitals related by common 
acceptance of basic design and operational principles’.71 What would this 
more comprehensive, so-called ‘whole hospital’, approach be like? One 
possible model was ‘Best Buy’. It was already being used for almost identical 
new hospitals at Bury St Edmunds and Frimley, and would later appear in 
slightly modified form elsewhere. However, its assumption of a certain level 
of community provision and its compact planning (which mitigated against 
                                                
65 ‘Oxford Method goes abroad’, Architects’ Journal, 155/19 (10 May 1972), 1011. 
66 The potential of this approach was also stressed in 1964 by the prominent architect John 
Weeks: ‘Hospitals for the 1970s’, RIBA Journal, 71/12 (December 1964), 507–16. 
67 Joseph Gleave, ‘Discussion’, in George H. Bell (ed.), Hospital and Medical School Design 
(Edinburgh, 1962), 98–99. 
68 List included in George H. Bell (ed.), Hospital and Medical School Design (Edinburgh, 1962), 
133 [mis-spelt as ‘Gelding’].  
69 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/662, Memo by K.G. Reeve, 29 August 1967. 
70 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/488, ‘Progress Report on Development Projects’, April 1967. 
71 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/752, Memo by J.R.B. Green, 7 May 1968; also  MH166/488, 
‘Building Working Party paper 21’, February 1968. 
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easy expansion or local variation) meant that it was discounted.72 By 1969, an 
alternative strategy had emerged in which standardization would take place 
at the level of hospital departments, rather than the whole hospital. These 
departments would be selected and arranged according to local needs and 
site conditions. In plan, they would branch off a highly serviced corridor, 
named the ‘Harness zone’.73 Its name reflected the wiring ‘harness’ – the 
electrical backbone – of the contemporary motorcar. Implicit in this form of 
planning was the idea that ‘the hospital building is a framework for the 
efficient discharge of functions whose performance may itself be subject to 
improvement’.74 In other words, the hospital was conceived as a structured 
and potentially changing network, rather than a finite entity: really only the 
‘Harness zone’ was seen as fixed. The use of a communications spine as the 
backbone of the proposed hospital recalls the speculative plans for the 
reconstruction of London produced by William and Aileen Tatton-Brown in 
the late 1930s, in which neighbourhoods were conceived as individual units 
in the manner of the later Harness hospital departments and were to be 
linked by a high-speed road system akin to the ‘Harness zone’.75 There are 
also similarities with Richard Llewelyn-Davies and John Weeks’ Northwick 
Park Hospital (begun in 1963), the planning of which was fundamentally 
informed by the idea of indeterminacy and similarly combined a fixed spine 
with changeable branches.76 More generally, much attention was being given 
to circulation and servicing within hospitals internationally, in part following 
the example in North America of Gordon Friesen. 
 
                                                
72 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/752, Report of the Sub-Group on Operational Policies for a 
‘Harness’ Hospital, March 1969. 
73 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/364, WP minutes, 20 October 1969. 
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75 For the 1930s plans, see John R. Gold, The Experience of Modernism: Modern Architects and the 
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In 1969 Ceri Davies, a senior member of the project team, proposed 
that the dimensions of the various departments connected to the ‘Harness 
zone’ would also be consistent. The ideal as he saw it was  
to develop a range of functionally + dimensionally consistent 
departments which relate physically one to another to form 
coordinated whole hospitals. The precise configuration of the resulting 
hospital will be determined by its size, local geographic conditions etc. 
[…] My preliminary study on size + shapes of departments indicates 
that most departments (and probably all) could fit within a standard 
strip dimension – this is in the region of 15 m.77 
The result would be a ‘standard kit of parts from which it would be possible 
to build up an almost endless range of hospital [designs]’ based around strips 
of building fifteen metres wide (fig. 3).78 These strips would be easily related 
to each other, and could potentially used the same building components. 
However, the ‘kit of parts’ continued to evolve. Alongside the linear strip 
plans, an alternative set of cruciform-plan departments was designed,79 and 
they soon seem to have been preferred. Joined together, the result would be a 
hospital with a regular grid of internal courtyards (fig. 4).80 This form echoed 
the ‘mat plan’ theories then being explored by such architects as Alison and 
Peter Smithson, in which buildings were planned with numerous internal 
courtyards, as well as the courtyard-based schemes for the reconstruction of 
Whitehall by Leslie Martin and Lionel March after 1963. The architects were 
probably also inspired by several recent hospitals which featured regular 
internal courtyards, including Wexham Park, Slough (begun 1957), and 
                                                
77 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/359, Note by Ceri Davies, 3 April 1969. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Howard Goodman, ‘Pros and cons of hospital standardising’, British Hospital and Social 
Science Journal, 5 December 1969, 2273–75. 
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Eastburn, West Yorkshire (1963-1971; fig. 5).81 Among the architects of 
Wexham Park was Howard Goodman, who had joined the Ministry of Health 
in 1960 and replaced Tatton-Brown as its chief architect in 1971.82 Meanwhile, 
Paul James, the designer of Eastburn, also had close Ministry connections, 
contributing to Harness feasibility studies.83  
 
Design work proceeded apace, with conferences being held to 
introduce the Harness approach to RHBs.84 Experiments were carried out 
with respect to building cladding and structure, and a type of deep structural 
beam was devised. These beams were to span the fifteen-metre width of the 
wards, with no intermediate supports that might restrict interior planning 
(fig. 6). The beams also created a large area above the ceilings through which 
engineering services would be threaded. Databases, intended for those 
designing hospitals, listed the approved standard components (the 
‘Manufacturer Data Base’) and charted the functions to be accommodated (the 
‘Activity Data Base’). There were also standard procedures for the processing 
and management of design projects (‘Capricode’), and databanks of 
production material (‘CUBITH’). The extent to which systems analysis could 
be applied to the Harness philosophy was evaluated. Computer programs 
were developed with the assistance of Cambridge University’s Centre for 
Land Use and Built Form Studies, allowing workable plans to be generated in 
a matter of days for comparison. Here the modernizing and centralizing 
ambitions of ‘Harness’ are especially apparent, with the deployment of 
computers in the briefing and design processes reflecting an enthusiasm for 
computing on the part of government. Computers, initially seen by officials as 
                                                
81 Eastburn: ‘Two hospitals’, Architects’ Journal, 154/45 (10 November 1971), 1061–78. 
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replacements for earlier office machines, were by the mid 1960s increasingly 
being installed in civil service departments. They were embedded in debates 
about modernity, especially after the Fulton Report of 1968 called for greater 
professionalism and efficiency on the part of the civil service.85  
 
Prototype Harness developments were put in hand, including an 
outpatient department at Walton Hospital, Merseyside, and complete 
hospitals at Dudley and Stafford (fig. 7). However, just as the project seemed 
to be nearing a full roll-out, it was challenged. In 1972, the construction 
specialist Henry Cruickshank concluded that Harness offered savings at the 
design and development stages, but that the buildings would be more 
expensive overall than those built on more conventional lines.86 His report 
suggested that Harness ideas might usefully inform a site development plan, 
but that detailed design could more efficiently be carried out on an ad hoc 
basis. In other words, Harness would become a method of planning only, not 
a fully standardized approach to planning, design, and construction. This 
idea was debated at length by the Working Party, and was finally adopted in 
1975.87  
 
On the one hand, the abandonment of the full Harness ideal was a 
pragmatic response to the economic situation, with severe cuts being imposed 
by government from late 1973 as a way to stem inflation. These cuts, 
introduced by a Conservative administration, were maintained by Labour 
after the 1974 elections.88 In such circumstances, Harness seemed unduly 
luxurious in its generous planning and perhaps over-specified engineering. 
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But how else might we explain its abandonment? Examining the effects of the 
managerial ‘turn’ in policy-making suggests a different interpretation. This 
‘turn’ not only led to the Cruickshank report but also to government interest 
in ‘cost-benefit analysis’, a technique which was to prove significant in the 
undoing of Harness. 
 
SYSTEMATIC DISCIPLINE: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Writing in 1977, the economist Alan Williams reflected on the relationship of 
his discipline to the NHS since the late 1960s:  
The attitude of both the medical profession and health service 
administrators towards economics and economists has changed 
dramatically. Then, virtually nobody wanted to know, and viewed the 
enterprise with alarm, incredulity, or blank incomprehension.89 
Williams, who had joined the University of York in 1964, was seconded to the 
Treasury between 1966 and 1968 and also spent time in the Ministry of 
Health.90 He sought to bring greater rigour to public policy decision-making 
through the practice of cost-benefit analysis: 
[Cost-benefit analysis] is systematic, it imposes discipline, it requires 
assumptions to be explicit and evidence to be presented, it is 
communicable, replicable, and relies on evidence and analytical 
methods which can be challenged, validated or rejected by others in a 
manner consistent with the norms set by the “scientific” sub-culture of 
our society.91 
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Modern Economic Analysis (Oxford, 1977), 301-38 (p. 320). 
90 Alan Maynard, ‘Obituary: Alan Williams’, British Medical Journal 331/51 (30 June 2005), 
doi:10.1136/bmj.331.7507.51 (accessed on 28 February 2017). 
91 Alan Williams, ‘‘Cost Benefit Analysis: bastard science? and/or insidious poison in the body 
politick’, in J.N. Wolfe (ed.) Cost Benefit and Cost Effectiveness: Studies and Analysis (London, 
1973), 30-64 (p. 35). 
 20 
Williams was a pioneer of the application of cost-benefit analysis to medical 
treatments within the emerging discipline of ‘health economics’.92 He also 
continued to maintain a working relationship with the DHSS,93 with his 
involvement fundamentally informing the fate of Harness. 
 
It was noted at a 1970 conference (organized by Williams) that 
decisions relating to health policy were ‘taken mainly on political judgment, 
or on grounds of expediency, or in relation to known public pressures’.94 The 
1962 Plan can be understood thus. Lord Craigton reported in 1960 that ‘we 
simply have not nearly enough of the basic information we ought to have to 
plan the future shape of the service and to improve its effectiveness.’95 
Raymond Gedling made the same point about hospital design more 
generally: ‘judgment is sometimes intuition; it is sometimes the very 
worthwhile benefit of one’s experience over years; and sometimes I think it 
consists of having a little drawer with a rule inside it which says “W.C.s, 80 
sq. ft.”.’96 However, in the early 1970s, the Heath government increasingly 
sought to encourage a rational approach to policymaking and spending.97 In 
July 1971, a meeting of DHSS officials considered ‘the running costs and cost 
benefit aspects of the Harness brief to treasury and in this connection [the] 
possibility of further exploration of the factors governing service planning in 
the medium and long term.’98 Subsequently, J.W. Hurst of the Economic 
Advisor’s Office noted that members of the York health economics group 
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might undertake a full analysis.99 Hurst cited a memo by a DHSS colleague 
which noted that insufficient consideration of the economic aspects of 
Harness had accompanied the design work.  
 
Williams’ direct involvement in Harness came about following the 
reform of government ‘research and development’ spending. In 1971, Lord 
Victor Rothschild produced a report for government on this topic.100 He 
argued that government ‘R&D’ should be overseen by ‘customer’ 
departments, each with a chief scientist, which would commission research 
from ‘contractors’ to support their decisions. Its recommendations were 
broadly accepted, and were implemented in 1974. Williams, as a member of 
the Chief Scientist’s Research Committee, was thus nominated to join the 
hospital Building Working Party.101 The timing of his arrival was significant. 
As we have noted, the Cruickshank Report – itself evidence of a ‘business-
minded’ approach to policy – had suggested the scaling back of Harness, and, 
with cuts in government expenditure, the Working Party now sought to 
establish ‘the direction which this [programme] should most profitably and 
economically take to assist health and local authorities at a time when money 
was scarce and new policies were being developed.’102 While public finances 
remained healthy there had been little incentive to question the programme. 
Abandoning it would hardly have seemed palatable in political terms. No 
parliamentarian would be keen to learn that the new hospital proposed for 
their constituency was not going to be built. However, in a deteriorating 
economy, Harness posed a particular challenge. Echoing Cruickshank’s 
conclusions, a 1973 report concluded that the capital cost of a Harness 
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hospital would be 7% more than the approved cost limits, although it was 
believed that savings at other stages of the process would mean that a 
Harness hospital might not be more expensive overall than a one-off design.103 
 
Williams, following Cruickshank, argued that Harness should 
comprise only what was termed ‘Data Pack 1’ – i.e., the stage when outline 
designs and layouts were produced.104 No use would be made of the 
proposed standardized structural components or cladding. He suggested that 
economic analysis showed that to develop and use only ‘Data Pack 1’ gave 
benefits similar to the use of the total system but with a much lower outlay. 
The architect Howard Goodman, however, proposed the continuation of the 
programme, arguing that to stop here made 
insufficient contribution to the Department’s broad objective of 
enabling hospitals to be built with a saving of planning and design 
time and with full compatibility of architectural and engineering 
services. This was the essence of the programme of systems and 
standards; examination of many projects pursued on traditional lines 
showed that compatibility was not being achieved in them.105 
In part, the debate was one of architectural philosophy. Should new hospitals 
be the product of a fully integrated, standardized system of briefing, design, 
and construction, or should the designers of individual projects have greater 
freedom? The debate also represented a test of the extent to which economics 
could be applied to policy. In the face of growing demands for the use in 
decision-making of quantifiable evidence, some Working Party members – 
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not least the architects – were keen to make claims for the so-called 
‘unquantifiable’ benefits of Harness.106  
 
Williams’ arguments ultimately prevailed. That Harness was scaled 
was unsurprising in view of the poor state of the public finances, but it might 
also be understood as evidence of the new attitude in policymaking – the 
‘systematic discipline’ advocated by Williams. At the same time, the way in 
which the Harness project had evolved also laid the programme open to 
question, for it similarly suggested a lack of ‘systematic discipline’. In 1940s 
Hertfordshire, the urgent need for new schools had served to focus attention, 
and a close-knit team had worked with a single manufacturer so that the first 
schools could be realised quickly. In contrast, the standardized hospital 
programme proceeded at a somewhat glacial pace, and sometimes seemed to 
be rather less single-minded. A note on the procedure to be followed by one 
of the many Harness committees demonstrates barely disguised irritation at 
the way that topics were brought up time and time again.107 Hospital and 
Health Services Review concurred, concluding in the wake of the Cruickshank 
Report that Harness, ‘for all its great merits’, was ‘inadequately organised’.108 
In addition, it seemed to be ‘in danger of being pursued for its own sake’. In 
this respect, the relationship between the initial standard departments work 
and the parallel ‘Best Buy’ exercise was not clear, and while the Working 
Party proposed in February 1966 that the two streams of work would 
eventually come together, they were essentially competing.109 Not only that, 
but whole streams of work were initiated and then abandoned. As we have 
noted, the standard department designs produced at the start of the project 
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did not easily relate to each other or the emerging ‘whole hospital’ Harness 
philosophy, which was developed as a parallel exercise.110 It was suggested 
that the initial templates should be presented as designs for the extension of 
existing hospitals,111 presumably so that this exercise did not seem like a 
complete waste of effort as attention moved to ‘whole hospital’ approaches. 
Other examples of apparent ‘mission creep’ include the development of the 
cruciform templates as an alternative to earlier linear designs, the expansion 
of Harness to include systems work in 1972, and the removal of that systems 
work in 1975.112 No wonder that as early as 1968 Ministry staff wondered if to 
outsiders it would seem that its efforts were not developing in a logical 
fashion.113 Or, as a more optimistic commentator put it, ‘it is typical that the 
Department’s lively architectural team move from one interesting idea to 
another before the first is more than a hole in the ground’.114 In some ways, 
Harness was in good company, being one of several technology-led 
government projects to go awry in the 1970s.115 And yet, the problems were 
not simply related to its ill-defined scope and rising cost. Who were the 
architects working for? As we shall see next, the RHBs were not always 
enthusiastic collaborators. 
 
HARNESS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE NHS 
In 1966 the Working Party recognized that the standardization programme 
might easily become unmanageable, noting that it did not ‘consider that there 
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would […] be only one standard ward, […] we should have to guard against 
the proliferation of designs.’116 In 1967, it similarly cautioned that 
the process must not be allowed to get out of hand.  It would not be 
consistent with the concept of standardisation to devise a wide range 
of variations to a standard plan.117 
In this respect, hospital standardization – and, indeed, the whole attempt to 
plan hospital provision – challenged the decentralized nature of the health 
service. The organizational structure of the NHS allowed individual regions 
considerable autonomy in determining their needs and proposing solutions. 
Proposals for building work were made by the RHBs, with the Ministry (and 
then the DHSS) only giving detailed consideration to large schemes.118 Its role, 
in theory at least, was to provide expertise and a check on practice. The very 
idea of standardization might, therefore, be resisted at the local level, as the 
Working Party recognized in 1966: ‘it would be incompatible with the present 
distribution of responsibilities between the Department and Boards for the 
former to impose standard designs on the latter’.119 Indeed, a paper of March 
1966 concluded that ‘building is a large part of the work of hospital boards 
and the imposition of standardisation might be seen by some as the first stage 
in a complete usurpation of their functions’.120 Certainly some soon feared 
that standardization was being imposed on them.121 There was also a risk that 
it would seem as if the considerable effort which some RHBs had invested in 
hospital design during the 1960s was being set aside.122 Furthermore, RHBs’ 
relationships with each other might also mitigate against standardization. 
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They would, it was noted in February 1966, ‘produce any number of good 
reasons for not adopting’ the designs of other Regions.123 
 
The Boards’ reluctance to adopt others’ designs was not simply a 
matter of professional rivalry or independence. Rather, it also related to the 
way that hospitals were operated. RHBs were responsible for defining the 
‘policies’ by means of which their hospitals would be run. The result was that 
spaces within a hospital would be staffed and used in ways that varied 
around the country. By implication, the size, shape, and specification of these 
spaces might similarly vary. These variations added to the challenges with 
which standardization already had to contend, such as the topography of 
individual sites, which could conceivably include buildings that were to be 
retained. The standard departments research needed to take such variations 
into account, and it came under pressure as a result. In August 1968, Tatton-
Brown cautioned that he was  
very concerned at the way the introduction of Standard Departments is 
being handled by the Department. In spite of repeated warnings, 
Boards are being offered a standard ward block plan produced by the 
Ministry as a fait accompli – a ward plan to end all ward plans.124 
The problem was partly that, to produce a standard design, a set of policies 
first had to be selected, and these policies might not be universally accepted 
by RHBs. For example, when a proposed standard department was evaluated 
by a group of nurses,  
the result was not encouraging. The proposed preparation area only 
permits one method of supply – the comprehensive pre-pack tray 
system and it provides an extremely “tight” area for this. You will 
agree I’m sure that although our outline policy says that a prepacked 
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tray system will be used we cannot in making national policy overlook 
the many hospitals who will not be able to afford or will not care to 
operate a comprehensive rather than a “splitters” sterile supply 
system. […] The hatch system may work better in Newcastle where 
labour is more readily available perhaps than in the South.125 
In spring 1967, the Working Party suggested that Boards were free to take on 
the standard building forms without the underlying policy assumptions.126 
However, in August 1967, it was thought that it would be hard to standardize 
the general ward layout without a rapid move to national policies, and that 
variations in layout were accordingly necessary.127 In November, the Working 
Party concluded that ‘in the course of consultations with outside 
representative bodies […] and with S.A.M.O.s [Senior Assistant Medical 
Officers] it became apparent that there was a considerable demand for 
alternative designs for wards and maternity departments based on different 
operational policies’.128 Policy variation thus implied design variations. 
 
If the initial standard ward designs thus challenged devolved practice, 
the whole-hospital Harness approach amplified the issue. In May 1968, it was 
reported that RHB secretaries had believed that the whole-hospital exercise 
was dominated by architects, a line of thinking that perhaps confirms the idea 
of Harness as in part an architect-led programme: ‘plans were produced and 
then the operational policies and functional requirements were produced 
rather than it being done the other way round in accordance with [the 
Ministry’s] own building procedures.’129 As the programme developed, the 
Working Party suggested that the phrase ‘whole hospital design’ was 
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preferable to any suggestion of standardization.130 The choice of words 
reflected the conception of Harness as a system rather than a static whole-
hospital template, but it also neatly played down any sense of an imposed 
standard. At various stages, the need for consultation with RHBs was 
emphasized, if only for strategic reasons: ‘co-operation should make the end 
result more acceptable.’131 If Boards remained unconvinced about the merits 
of standardization, the designs would simply sit on a shelf and the resources 
spent on producing the templates would have been wasted. Not only that, but 
there was also a question of staffing. Goodman reportedly wanted standard 
departments to be designed by the Ministry, rather than at a devolved level,132 
but even allowing for the expansion of its architectural function, the Ministry 
(and later the DHSS) lacked the resources fully to develop the Harness 
programme itself in a timely fashion. By allocating research into the design of 
individual departments to the architects employed by the RHBs, the 
programme was able to proceed more rapidly. In addition, regional 
agreement might be more effectively secured. 
 
The evolution of Harness was seen in some quarters as evidence of 
creeping bureaucracy and centralization, as an editorial in Hospital and Health 
Services Review explained: 
It is not difficult to see why the central department has involved itself 
much more in the running of the service than had been expected in 
1948. Any organisation has a natural tendency to maintain and if 
possible extend its functions. A central organisation in a sense knows 
more […] The aims of the service have never been clear, so that 
                                                
130 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/664, WP minutes, 1 August 1968. 
131 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/750, ‘Building Research and Development’, n.d. 
132 TNA: PRO, Kew, MH166/487, BWP Paper 13, ‘Implementing the Report of the Working 
Party’, n.d. [1966/67]. 
 29 
circulars and other interference have veered between suggestion and 
instruction […].133 
The author of a 1974 article – written at a time when the RHBs were being 
replaced by the new Health Authorities – made similar points, observing that 
‘factors making for bureaucracy are strengthened by tendencies within the 
service’ and noting the ever-growing collection of guidance documents issued 
from the centre.134 The building programme seemingly amplified this line of 
travel: 
Planning (in the sense of capital schemes) became a major task in the 
1960s when the Hospital Building Programme began. Early hesitant 
guidance soon hardened into firm rulings, which now seem likely to 
result in straightforward standardisation with Harness designs. 
Standard design will mean standard working methods, to give a 
standard level of service against norms centrally decided. But even 
pre-Harness working has been constrained by the tight cost limits laid 
down, so that experiment and departure from centrally-approved 
provision has been possible only in the rare cases where no extra 
spending is incurred.135 
The author of a 1977 article concluded that the NHS had a fundamental 
‘structural problem’, noting that the DHSS issued more circulars in a month 
than the Department of Education and Science managed in a year.136 Indeed, 
the new Regional Health Authorities were part of a more hierarchical 
structure than the previous RHBs. In December 1975, the Minister of Health, 
David Owen, argued that: 
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The health service in many areas has not achieved sufficient benefits 
from being a national centralised service. Nowhere is this more 
obvious than in hospital design. Up and down the country, regional 
health authorities have been designing their own one-off hospitals. The 
Best Buy is a notable exception.137 
Thus for all that Owen argued in December 1975 that ‘the DHSS does not 
wish to impose detailed designs’, the ‘genuine partnership’ that he proposed 
was intended ultimately ‘to ensure that the Department’s lead in the design 
work reaps its full rewards.’138 There are echoes here of wider centralizing 
tendencies on the part of post-war governments, which Marie Hicks has 
linked explicitly to the use of computer technologies as a way to concentrate 
power among a small technocratic elite.139 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Harness was an ambitiously conceived manifestation of the belief that 
modern hospitals could deliver long-term savings for government. It was 
hoped that standard layouts and structural components would speed the 
realization of hospitals which, through their planned location and flexible 
design, would accommodate high-technology modern medicine and 
potentially growing patient demand in an efficient, cost-effective manner. The 
‘off-the-shelf’ information contained in the Harness system would facilitate 
financial ‘control’ of the process.140 The programme thus responded to a desire 
for economy – in operation and also, initially at least, in construction – whilst 
also embodying the modernizing impulses and belief in centralized planning 
that were shared by both Labour and the Conservatives in the late 1950s and 
1960s. Indeed, by the early 1970s the modernity of Harness was evident not 
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only in the contemporary appearance and ambiance of the planned hospitals 
but also the use of innovative data processing techniques and computer 
technology to design them. Despite the failure to evaluate fully the economics 
of Harness in its early stages, standardization was undoubtedly more than an 
expensive ‘hunch’, to borrow the term used by one civil servant to describe 
the basis of health policy in 1970.141 The idea that it might allow a reduction in 
hospital design time without compromising quality seemed reasonable in the 
face of the extended time that had been spent designing ‘one-off’ hospitals in 
the 1960s. Not only that, but rationalized planning had been deployed 
apparently successfully in such hospitals as Vale of Leven and Eastburn, as 
well as schools and housing.  
 
The causes of the demise of the Harness programme were several. At a 
time of spending cuts, the cost of large numbers of lavishly planned and 
serviced hospitals was not only undesirably high, but promised to be higher 
than more conventionally designed projects. Also significant was growing 
scepticism of standardized, industrialized building programmes. Owen, 
reviewing a document which proposed the scaling back of Harness, 
concluded in 1975 that ‘we have had enough building disasters on our 
hands’.142 However, other issues suggest the need for a more nuanced 
interpretation. Although rooted in a well-intentioned strain of architectural 
modernism which had successfully delivered standardized schools and 
housing, the greater complexity of the hospital (compared with those building 
types) was challenging. Quite apart from the range of functions, spaces, and 
technologies a hospital has to accommodate, Harness was particularly 
ambitious in its engineering. Its wide-span beams were accompanied not only 
by cladding and other building components but also a vast range of room 
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layouts as well as the paraphernalia of databases and computer programs. 
The challenges were compounded by the ever-expanding scale of the Harness 
programme. In this respect, the apparent rationality of the 1960s planning 
documents contrasts with the rather more iterative development of a strategy 
for their implementation. In time, Harness fell foul of a drive towards 
rational, evidence-based policy-making. Not only that, but Harness 
foundered for the very reason that had necessitated its flexibility, namely the 
need for local RHBs to shape their own provision. The tensions that proved 
the undoing of Harness in the mid-seventies resulted from the way that the 
NHS had been set up in the 1940s. 
 
Was Harness a failure? Only two complete hospitals were built, in 
Dudley and Stafford; even then, the later phases at Stafford featured a 
modified version of the system.143 Most 1970s hospitals remained one-off 
projects. However, the basic Harness planning principles had a significant 
afterlife.144 In 1975, the Harness plans were scaled back according to ‘Best Buy’ 
philosophy, and the ambition to standardize hospital building structure and 
cladding was abandoned. The result was the so-called ‘Nucleus’ approach, 
which was essentially concerned with planning alone rather than being a 
comprehensive system of briefing, design, and construction. Its more limited 
ambition allowed it successfully to navigate the centre/periphery relationship 
that had partly tripped up Harness. Newham District General, east London, 
had been planned as a Harness hospital, but in August 1975 was announced 
as the first Nucleus project.145 Others followed. More than fifty Nucleus 
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schemes had been begun by 1986, including prototype low-energy versions,146 
and Nucleus became the dominant form of new DGHs in England in the 
1980s (fig. 8). Harness-related systems, too, including the Activity Database, 
also survived in updated form into the twenty-first century, even as a new 
wave of ‘private finance initiative’ hospitals took rather different and often 
more consciously ‘iconic’ forms.  
 
Otto Saumarez Smith has recently proposed that central government’s 
approach to inner-city planning in the 1980s represented not a complete neo-
liberal rupture with Welfare State ideologies but rather a reworking of earlier 
ideals.147 We might similarly conclude that, while ‘the party [was] over’, as 
Tony Crosland put it with reference to local-authority housing in 1975, the 
‘after-party’ was only just beginning as far as hospital construction was 
concerned. The example of the standardized hospital programme suggests 
not only that the framing of a ‘long 1980s’ in British architectural history 
might be productive as a counterpart to the more sophisticated and 
historicized understandings of the period now being advanced by social and 
political historians,148 but also that the building programmes of those ‘long 
1980s’ should be interrogated for continuities as well as the significant 
changes of Thatcherism. The sixties fashion for planning had a longer afterlife 
than we might initially assume. 
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